

1970
YEAR
STAMP

SECUP
N.B. T
UPGR

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

CONFIDENTIAL

Contents checked for transfer to D.R.O.
(Sgd.)
Date 23-3-71

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

DEPT.
or POST

NEAR EASTERN

FILE No. NE M 2/14 (Part)

TITLE: ATTITUDE OF JORDAN TO
FOUR POWER TALKS

REFER TO			REFER TO			REFER TO		
NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE
Reg		20/1						
py	2	23/1						
Reg		25/1						
py	3	28/1						
Reg		12/2						
ESM	4	16/2						
Reg		19/2						
py	6	20/2						
Reg		4/3						
py	8	4/3						
Reg		18/3						
VB	9/11	18/3						
Reg		4/5						
VB	12	4/5						
Reg.								

S
368

FCO 17/1147

CLOSED
UNTIL
2001

Registry Address
Room No. 115
Downing Street (W)

SE
N.B
UP

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

CONFIDENTIAL

YEAR STAMP
1970

HPW

DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.

FILE No. NE M 2/14 PART

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A AND R4 876

COPY

PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO AMMAN

TELNO 4

5 JANUARY 1970
(NED)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NO. 4 OF 5 JANUARY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, PARIS, MOSCOW AND SAVING TO BEIRUT, UKDEL NATO, JEDDA AND KUWAIT.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 9: MIDDLE EAST.

KING HUSSEIN RECEIVED MR. LUARD AND MR. ARTHUR TO-DAY. ARTHUR HAD PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED THE SAME SUBJECTS WITH ZAID RIFAI ON 2 JANUARY.

2. KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT THE AMERICAN DOCUMENT ON JORDAN/ISRAEL, TOGETHER WITH MR. ROGERS' SPEECH, REPRESENTED AN IMPORTANT ADVANCE. BUT JORDAN COULD NOT MOVE ON HER OWN: EGYPT WOULD HAVE TO GO THROUGH THE DOOR AT THE SAME TIME. HE WAS THINKING OF GOING TO CAIRO SOON TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH PRESIDENT NASSER, WHO STILL WANTED A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. FOR JORDAN AND EGYPT THERE WAS INDEED NO REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE PURSUIT OF SUCH A SETTLEMENT. THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER ISRAEL WANTED. ONE.

3. USING ARGUEMENTS SIMILAR TO THOSE IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 822 OF 1969 TO CAIRO (NOT TO ALL), WE EMPHASISED THAT THE ARABS WOULD HAVE TO INDICATE THEIR READINESS TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THE AMERICAN DOCUMENTS, IN ORDER TO PUT THE AMERICANS IN A POSITION TO LEAN ON THE ISRAELIS. THE KING SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS ARGUEMENT. THE ONLY SPECIFIC POINT HE RAISED WAS THE THE MODIFICATIONS TO THE 1949 ARMISTICE LINE SHOULD BE "RECIPROCAL". WE SAID THAT WE THOUGHT THE JORDANIANS WOULD BE UNWISE TO INSIST ON THE INSERTION OF THAT WORD IN ANY FORMULATION ON THE BOUNDARY.

4. THE KING ASKED ABOUT A DOCUMENT ON ISRAEL/SYRIA. ALTHOUGH THE SYRAINS HAD NOT ACCEPTED THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, THEY WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO COME IN ON A SETTELEMENT WHICH PROVIDED
/FOR ISRAELI

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. WE REMINDED THE KING THAT THE ARABS WOULD HAVE TO AGREE ON SOMETHING BEFORE PROGRESS COULD BE MADE AND ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD EVER AGREE IN ADVANCE ON ANYTHING AT ALL. THE KING RECOGNISED WITH A SMILE THAT THEY WOULD NOT. WE SUGGESTED THAT IN THAT CASE IT WOULD BE IN JORDAN'S INTEREST TO LEAVE THEM OUT FOR THE TIME BEING.

5. THE KING FINALLY SUGGESTED THAT H.M.G. SHOULD SUPPORT THE AMERICAN POSITION IN CAIRO. WE SAID THAT WE HAD SPOKEN TO THE EGYPTIANS BOTH BEFORE AND SINCE RABAT IN MUCH THE SAME SENSE AS WE HAD SPOKEN TO HIM.

STEWART

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET
AND CABINET OFFICE]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
N.A.D.
ARAB. DEPT.
U.N. DEPT.
AMER. DEPT.
RESEARCH DEPT.
(AMER. SECT.)

CONFIDENTIAL

FFFFF

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY AMMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 18


8 JANUARY 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

TOP COPY

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 18 OF 8 JANUARY RFI UKMIS NEW YORK,
WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, PARIS, MOSCOW AND SAVING
TO UKDEL NATO, JEDDA AND KUWAIT.

MY TELNO 9 AND YOUR TELNO 4: MIDDLE EAST.



I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF A GENERAL TALK WITH THE JORDANIAN
FOREIGN MINISTER THIS MORNING TO SPEAK AS MR. LUARD AND MR. ARTHUR
HAD SPOKEN TO KING HUSSEIN.

2. ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI SAID THAT THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT STILL
HAD THE AMERICAN DOCUMENT UNDER DISCUSSION AND THAT THEY WERE
HOPING SHORTLY TO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH THE
EGYPTIANS. HE WAS ADVISING AGAINST KING HUSSEIN'S GOING TO CAIRO
AT THIS STAGE BUT THOUGHT HE MIGHT GO HIMSELF.

3. RIFAI INDICATED THAT THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT EXPECTED A
BRITISH PAPER TO BE PRODUCED OR THAT WE SHOULD AT LEAST ATTEMPT A
BRIDGING OPERATION BETWEEN THE AMERICAN AND OTHER PROPOSALS NOW
ON THE FOUR POWER TABLE. HE ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE LOGICAL AND
USEFUL FOR US TO PUT FORWARD OUR OWN PROPOSALS BOTH BECAUSE AS
AUTHORS OF RESOLUTION 242 WE WERE IN THE STRONGEST POSITION TO
SAY WHAT IT MEANT AND BECAUSE THE RUSSIANS WERE BOUND ON PRINCIPLE
TO REJECT ANY PROPOSALS COMING FROM THE U.S. ALMOST THE SAME PRO-
POSALS IN A BRITISH PAPER WOULD STAND A BETTER CHANCE OF SOVIET
ACCEPTANCE.

/ 4.

Page 22.1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

4. I TOLD THE MINISTER THAT WE THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS QUITE ENOUGH PAPER ON THE TABLE ALREADY AND MADE AS STRONGLY AS I COULD THE POINT THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE ARABS TO GO ALONG WITH THE AMERICAN DOCUMENTS IF AMERICAN LEANING ON THE ISRAELIS WAS EVER TO BE EFFECTIVE. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD GIVE WEIGHT TO THIS ARGUMENT IN HIS TALKS WITH THE EGYPTIANS.

5. I FOUND RIFAI MORE THAN USUALLY DEPRESSED ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT JARRING WOULD ACHIEVE ANYTHING WHATEVER BRIEF HE WAS GIVEN. THE CURRENT MILITARY ESCALATION IS OF COURSE CAUSING CONCERN TO THE JORDANIANS AND THE NEWS THAT THE

LEBANESE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF HAS BEEN REMOVED MADE RIFAI FEAR INCREASING TROUBLE BETWEEN ARAB REGIMES AND THE FEDAYEEN. BUT HE APPEARED TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT ANY PROGRESS THAT RESULTED FROM THE FOUR POWER TALKS WOULD BE SLOW AND, TO BEGIN WITH, LIMITED IN SCOPE.

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND ROUTINE TO WASHINGTON, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, PARIS, MOSCOW AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO, JEDDA, KUWAIT.

SIR P. ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[COPIES TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET AND TO CABINET OFFICE
(FOR SIR R. HOOPER)]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
N.A.D.
ARABIAN DEPT
U.N.D.
AMERICAN DEPT
E.E.S.D.
W.EUR.DEPT
RESEARCH DEPT (AMER.SEC)
RESEARCH DEPT (SOV.SEC)
RESEARCH DEPT (W.E.SEC)
NEWS DEPT
MOD INT


CYPHER CAT/A

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

PRIORITY CAIRO TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 108 19 JANUARY 1970

CONFIDENTIAL - G U A R D

ADDSD TO FCO TELNO. 108 DATED 19/1/70 AND TO AMMAN, TEL AVIV,
WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PARIS AND MOSCOW.
REPEATED SAVING TO BEIRUT.



1 CALLED ON JORDAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN HIS HOTEL ON 17TH JANUARY.

2. IN THE COURSE OF CONVERSATION MR. RIFAI SAID HE WAS CO-ORDINATING WITH HIS U.A.R. OPPOSITE NUMBER THE ATTITUDE OF BOTH COUNTRIES TO THE UNITED STATES PROPOSALS IN RESPECT OF JORDAN AND THE UAR. IN CONNECTION WITH THE JORDAN PROPOSALS HE SAID A REPLY MIGHT BE MADE SOON AFTER HIS RETURN TO AMMAN WHICH WOULD PROBABLY BE ON 20TH JANUARY. ON THE NATURE OF THE REPLY HE WAS (NATURALLY) CAGEY BUT SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE POSITIVE IN GENERAL THOUGH THERE WERE SPECIFIC AMERICAN PROPOSALS WHICH COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED. HE SAID THAT BOTH THE UAR AND JORDAN STILL DESIRED A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ON THE LINES OF RESOLUTION 242. THEY WERE NOT TO BE DIVIDED.

3. MR. RIFAI SPOKE IN HIS USUAL GENERALISED WAY BUT, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, THE GIST OF THE BALANCE OF OUR CONVERSATION WAS TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE WERE TWO QUESTIONS ON WHICH THE ARABS MIGHT SEEK PRELIMINARY ELUCIDATION FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT:

(A) WHAT ASSURANCE HAD THEY THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD PERSUADE ISRAEL TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSALS ?

(B) WERE THE PROPOSALS REALLY ON A TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT BASIS AS THE UNITED STATES SIDE HAD SUBSEQUENTLY SAID ?

4. ON (A) ABOVE, MR. RIFAI OBSERVED IT WAS RELEVANT TO NOTE THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD PUBLICLY REJECTED THE PROPOSALS AND HAD ACCOMPANIED THIS REJECTION BY WHAT WERE 'TERRORIST' BOMBARDMENTS ON TARGETS IN JORDAN AND THE UAR

P-4261
CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

/WITH

WITH POLITICAL AIMS. IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WERE IN FACT ABLE TO "PRODUCE" ISRAEL, ONE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED THEM TO HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT ABILITY BY INDUCING THE ISRAELIS TO MODERATE HOSTILITIES WHILE THE PROPOSALS WERE BEING STUDIED. IN SHORT, IT STILL REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EITHER COULD DELIVER THE ISRAELIS OR WANTED TO DO SO.

5. ON (B) THERE WERE ASPECTS OF THE UNITED STATES PROPOSALS WHICH JORDAN (SITUATED AS IT WAS) SIMPLY COULD NOT AFFORD TO ACCEPT - LOSS OF TERRITORY WAS ONE. THERE WAS ALSO THE FACT THAT THERE WERE ALSO OTHER PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE (RUSSIAN AND FRENCH). IT STILL REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE UNITED STATES PROPOSALS WERE AN ATTEMPTED DIKTAT OR WERE A SERIOUS BASIS FOR DISCUSSION.

6. ARISING OUT OF BOTH OF THESE TWO CONSIDERATIONS, MR. RIFAI SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE ARABS TO BE SURE THAT THE UNITED STATES PROPOSALS WOULD NOT BE USED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AS THE THIN END OF THE WEDGE - A DEVICE BY WHICH THE UAR AND JORDAN WOULD BE BROUGHT INTO DISCUSSIONS ONLY TO DISCOVER THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COULD NOT OR WOULD NOT CARRY THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT AND THEREFORE INSISTED ON FURTHER CONCESSIONS FROM THE ARAB SIDE GOING WELL BEYOND THOSE LAID DOWN IN RESOLUTION 242.

FCO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY TO AMMAN, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEWYORK AND ROUTINE TO PARIS AND MOSCOW.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BEIRUT.

SIR R. BEAUMONT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N. EAST. DEPT.

AMER DEPT.

N. AFR. DEPT

ARAB DEPT.

U. N. D.

E. E. S. D.

W. EUR. DEPT.

RES. DEPT. (W. EUR. SECT)

NEWS DEPT.

MOD INTERNAL

4

CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

TOP COPY

PRIORITY FROM AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 70

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
11 FEBRUARY 1970

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY NO. 10
12 FEB 1970
Nem 2/14

CONFIDENTIAL

GUARD

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 70 OF 11 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION PRIORITY TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.
ROUTINE TO TEL AVIV, CAIRO, PARIS AND MOSCOW.
SAVING TO BEIRUT.

CSM
12/14
Re

MY TELEGRAM NO 42: MIDDLE EAST - AMERICAN PROPOSALS.
MY U.S. COLLEAGUE HAS GIVEN ME AN ACCOUNT OF HIS SERIES
OF TALKS WITH JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN WHICH THE
LATTER HAD ASKED FOR QUOTE CLARIFICATION UNQUOTE OF
CERTAIN POINTS IN THE U.S. PAPER. SYMMES SAID HE THOUGHT
THESE HAD GONE REASONABLY WELL ALTHOUGH RIFAI HAD NOT
BEEN ABLE TO GRASP THE POINT THAT THE AMERICANS JUDGED THAT,
IN PRESENTING THESE PROPOSALS, THEY HAD GONE AS FAR
AS THEY POSSIBLY COULD TO MEET ARAB REQUIREMENTS
WHILE PRESERVING SOME HOPE OF BEING ABLE TO DELIVER THE
ISRAELIS.

2. DISCUSSION HAD LARGELY CONCERNED THE PROVISIONS FOR
GAZA AND JERUSALEM. ON THE FORMER RIFAI HAD FIRST OBJECTED
TO THE REFERENCE TO THE NEED FOR AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL
(ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS WAS AN INTER-ARAB PROBLEM) BUT
SEEMED LATER TO ACCEPT THE AMERICAN VIEW. AS TO JERUSALEM,
HE WAS STILL PRESSING FOR A CLEAR ANSWER TO THE QUESTION
QUOTE DOES THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL APPLY ? UNQUOTE.
SYMMES SAID HIS INSTRUCTIONS ENABLED HIM TO SAY ONLY THAT
NOTHING IN THE PROPOSALS ON JERUSALEM EXCLUDED APPLICATION OF
THE PRINCIPLE, AND HE TOLD ME IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THAT HE
HAD BEEN AUTHORISED TO SAY (UNDERLINE NEXT TWO WORDS)
INTER ALIA THAT THE U.S. GOVT. ENVISAGED JORDANIAN
ADMINISTRATION IN THE ARAB PART OF THE CITY.

/3. I LATER

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

-2-

3. I LATER HAD THE OPPORTUNITY OF ASKING RIFAI WHETHER HE HAD FOUND THESE CONTACTS REASSURING. HIS ANSWER WAS QUOTE NOT AT ALL: THEY ARE USELESS UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT FAR TOO MUCH WAS LEFT FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHOSE POSITIONS WERE WELL-KNOWN TO BE MILES APART. HE THEN WENT TO THE POINT OF WITHDRAWAL AND JERUSALEM AND SAID THAT UNLESS THE JORDANIANS GOT A CLEAR AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER TO THEIR QUESTION THEY (AND THE EGYPTIANS) COULD NOT CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE WITH THE AMERICANS -NOR, HE IMPLIED, WITH JARRING. I ARGUED AT SOME LENGTH THAT THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS ON JERUSALEM, AS I UNDERSTOOD THEM, DESERVED VERY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION BY THE ARABS, AND THAT IT WOULD BE TACTICALLY UNWISE FOR THEM TO TURN DOWN WHAT LOOKED LIKE THE BEST HOPE OF GETTING THE AMERICANS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE IN ISRAELI.

4. I WAS THEN TREATED TO A LONG TIRADE ON THE CYNICISM OF THE AMERICANS AND THE THESIS THAT IF THEY WANTED PEACE IN THE AREA THEY WOULD NOT CONTINUE TO SUPPLY OFFENSIVE WEAPONS TO ISRAEL SO LONG AS SHE WAS STILL IN OCCUPATION OF ARAB TERRITORIES.

5. RIFAI HAS, OF COURSE, ALWAYS BEEN A HARD-LINER ON QUOTE WITHDRAWAL UNQUOTE AND IT WAS NO NEWS TO HEAR THAT THE ARABS MAKE SATISFACTION ON JERUSALEM A (UNDERLINE NEXT THREE WORDS) SIN QUA NON FOR ACCEPTANCE OF THE REST OF THE PACKAGE. MOREOVER, THE MINISTER WAS EXHAUSTED AND DEPRESSED. I CONCLUDE THAT THE JORDANIANS WILL NOT TAKE PUBLICLY A NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TO THE U.S. PROPOSALS AT THIS STAGE, BUT THAT IF THE AMERICANS ANNOUNCE A NEW PHANTOM DEAL THEY ARE ALMOST BOUND TO. BUT I HEARD NOTHING TO SUPPORT THE VIEW THAT GIVEN A LITTLE TIME, THE ARABS WILL COME ROUND TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE AMERICAN INTERPRETATION OF RESOLUTION 242.

/FCO PASS

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

AMMAN TELNO. 70 TO F.C.O.

-3-

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS PRIORITY TO U.K.MIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON
ROUTINE TO PARIS AND MOSCOW SAVING TO BEIRUT.

SIR P. ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING STREET AND THE CABINET OFFICE]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NEAR EASTERN DEPT

NORTH AFRICAN DEPT

ARABIAN DEPT

UNITED NATIONS DEPT

WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPT

E.E.S.D.

AMERICAN DEPT

RESEARCH DEPT (W. & S. EUROP. SECTIONS)

RESEARCH DEPT (AMERICAN SECTION)

RESEARCH DEPT (SOVIET SECTION)

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NO 392

13 FEBRUARY 1970

(NE)

CONFIDENTIAL

GUARD

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 392 OF 13 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW PARIS AND SAVING TO BEIRUT.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 436 : MIDDLE EAST.

THE U.S. EMBASSY HAVE GIVEN ARTHUR AN ACCOUNT OF TWO MEETINGS WHICH THE U.S. AMBASSADOR AT AMMAN HAD WITH THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN ON 10 AND 11 FEBRUARY RESPECTIVELY.

2. RIFAI TOLD SYMMES THAT KING HUSSEIN'S EFFORTS IN CAIRO TO GET A FAVOURABLE RESPONSE FROM THE EGYPTIANS TO THE U.S. PROPOSALS HAD PROVED FRUITLESS. NASSER HAD SAID THAT HE SAW THREE MAIN OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF ACCEPTING THESE PROPOSALS. THE FIRST, AND MOST IMPORTANT, WAS THE FORMULATION ON JERUSALEM. NASSER HAD SAID THAT HE COULD ACCEPT WHATEVER HUSSEIN ACCEPTED ON THIS: BUT HE DID NOT SEE HOW HUSSEIN COULD ACCEPT AN ISRAELI QUOTE PRESENCE UNQUOTE IN EAST JERUSALEM (IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THIS MEANT SIMPLY A MILITARY PRESENCE OR APPLIED TO A PRESENCE OF ANY KIND). THE SECOND OBSTACLE WAS THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS SYRIA. NASSER ASKED WHY THE AMERICANS COULD NOT SIMPLY STATE THAT THE PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THEIR TWO SETS OF PROPOSALS APPLIED EQUALLY TO SYRIA. THE THIRD OBSTACLE WAS THE QUESTION OF PROCEDURE. NASSER HAD SAID THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT EITHER DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS OR THE RHODES FORMULA.

3. HUSSEIN HAD TOLD SYMMES THAT NEITHER HE NOR NASSER COULD ACCEPT ANY PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLEMENT UNTIL THE CURRENT SERIES OF ISRAELI RAIDS ON THE U.A.R. HAD STOPPED AND UNTIL THEY KNEW THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT MAKE A NEW ARMS DEAL WITH ISRAEL. HE HAD SAID THAT IF THE AMERICANS DID MAKE SUCH A DEAL, ALL PROSPECTS OF ARAB ACCEPTANCE OF AMERICAN PROPOSALS WOULD DISAPPEAR.

4. WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL KEEP CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON THIS SUBJECT AND THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO OBTAIN FROM THEM A FULLER ACCOUNT OF THE JORDANIAN/AMERICAN DIALOGUE THAN WE HAVE HAD HITHERTO.

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

/5. WE

5. WE WERE INTERESTED TO READ THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF AMMAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 72. AT FIRST SIGHT, THIS APPEARS TO CONFLICT WITH WAHL'S STATEMENT REPORTED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ARE UNABLE TO BE MORE PRECISE IN THEIR DIALOGUE WITH THE JORDANIANS ON MATTERS WHICH THEIR PROPOSALS DELIBERATELY LEAVE OPEN FOR NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES. WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEW (WITHOUT CONSULTING THE STATE DEPARTMENT) WHETHER YOU THINK THE AUTHORITY GIVEN TO SYMMES REPRESENTS A SHIFT IN U.S. POLICY. OUR UNDERSTANDING IN THE PAST HAS BEEN THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE TALKED ABOUT THE FUTURE ADMINISTRATION OF JERUSALEM WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO WHAT MIGHT BE DECIDED ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY. BUT THE CONCEPT OF JORDANIAN ADMINISTRATION SEEMS DIFFICULT TO RECONCILE WITH ANY SOVEREIGNTY OTHER THAN JORDANIAN.

STEWART [COPIES SENT TO MR. MOON NO.10 DOWNING STREET & SIR R.HOOPER CABINET OFFICE]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
N.A.D.
ARAB DEPT.
U.N.D.
W.E.D.
E.E.S.D.
RES. DEPT. { W.E.SECT }
" " { S.E.SECT }
" " { AMER SECT }
" " { SOVIET SECT }

6

copy 131

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

CYPHER CAT A


ROUTINE FROM AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 78

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

GUARD



ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 78 OF 13 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV,
CAIRO, PARIS AND MOSCOW. SAVING TO BEIRUT.

MY TELEGRAM NO 70 PARA. 3: MIDDLE EAST - AMERICAN PROPOSALS.

MY US COLLEAGUE HAS TOLD ME IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THAT HE
HAS INFORMED THE JORDANIANS, ON INSTRUCTIONS, THAT HIS
GOVERNMENT WOULD SUPPORT A SETTLEMENT INVOLVING, ON
JERUSALEM:

- (A) NO PHYSICAL SEPERATION OF ISRAELI AND ARAB PARTS.,
- (B) NO RISTRATION OF ACCESS OF CHRISTIANS, JEWS OR
MUSLIMS TO THEIR HOLY PLACES.,
- (C) ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FREEDOM OF ACTION FOR ARABS AND
ISRAELIS EACH IN THEIR SECTOR (THIS SEEMS TO AMOUNT VIRTUALLY
TO QUOTE ADMINISTRATION UNQUOTE)., AND
- (D) NO RECOGNITION OF UNILATERAL ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES.

2. JORDANIANS ARE STILL TAKING THE LINE THAT THESE
PROPOSALS ARE NOT AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE TO A STRAIGHT
AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER TO THEIR QUESTION ON WITHDRAWAL.

/FCO

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

Page 19.1

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

- 2 -

FCO PASS UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW AND PARIS,
SAVING TO BEIRUT.

SIR P. ADAMS

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

/COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET AND CABINET OFFICE/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

N.AFR.DEPT.

ARABIAN DEPT.

U.N.DEPT.

W. EUR. DEPT.

E.E.S.D.

AMERICAN DEPT.

RES. D. (W.E. & S. SECTIONS)

RES. D. (AMERICAN SEC.)

RES. D. (SOVIET SEC.)

CONFIDENTIAL - GUARD

NNNNN


CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO 483

CONFIDENTIAL
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
17 FEBRUARY, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELEGRAM NO 483 OF 17 FEBRUARY REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK AMMAN TEL AVIV CAIRO PARIS
MOSCOW AND SAVING TO BEIRUT.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 392: MIDDLE EAST.



WHILE COMPARING NOTES WITH ATHERTON TODAY ABOUT THE CURRENT
SITUATION, THE COUNSELLOR ASKED ATHERTON ABOUT THE LATEST
EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN AND THE
JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE TWO U.S. PAPERS. ATHERTON
CONFIRMED THAT IN THEIR COMMENTS THE JORDANIANS HAD FOCUSED
PRINCIPALLY ON JERUSALEM. RIFAI HAD ASKED WHETHER THE AMERICAN
FORMULATION MEANT THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD WITHDRAW FROM EAST
JERUSALEM, AND HE HAD URGED THAT AT THE VERY LEAST THE AMERICANS
SHOULD SAY THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM EAST JERUSALEM WAS
NOT EXCLUDED.

2. ATHERTON COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS THE KIND OF PRECISION WHICH
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WERE UNWILLING TO GIVE SINCE NOTHING SHORT
OF ARMED FORCE WAS LIKELY TO GET THE ISRAELIS OUT OF EAST
JERUSALEM. THE STATE DEPARTMENT PREFERRED, THEREFORE, TO THINK
IN TERMS OF GETTING THE JORDANIANS IN AS BEING MORE REALISTIC THAN
THE CONCEPT OF GETTING THE ISRAELIS OUT. SYMMES HAD ACCORDINGLY
BEEN AUTHORISED TO REPLY TO RIFAI SAYING THAT IN THE U.S. VIEW
THE ONLY THINGS WITH REGARD TO JERUSALEM WHICH WERE EXCLUDED
WERE:

- (A) A REDIVISION OF THE CITY;
- (B) THE REFUSAL OF FREE ACCESS TO THE CITY;
- (C) THE DENIAL TO JORDAN OF ANY ROLE IN EAST JERUSALEM.

ATHERTON DID NOT SPECIFY WHAT KIND OF ROLE THE JORDANIANS
MIGHT HAVE. HE DID SAY THAT WHEN, ON 4 FEBRUARY, THIS REPLY
WAS GIVEN TO RIFAI, THE LATTER HAD NOT SEEMED AT ALL CONCERNED

/AT

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 19.1

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

AT LEAVING THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY OPEN THOUGH HE HAD CONTINUED TO STRESS THE NEED FOR MORE PRECISION ABOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM EAST JERUSALEM. THE IMPLICATION OF WHAT ATHERTON SAID WAS THAT THE AUTHORITY GIVEN TO SYMMES TO PUT FORWARD THESE EXCLUSIONS WAS NOT REGARDED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT AS BEING A SHIFT IN U.S. POLICY, BUT RATHER AS AN EXPLANATION OR AMPLIFICATION OF THEIR EXISTING FORMULATIONS ON JERUSALEM, STILL AVOIDING THE PRECISION ON WITHDRAWAL WHICH THEY FEEL THEY CANNOT GIVE. IT DID NOT SEEM FROM THE WAY ATHERTON PUT ALL THIS THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WERE NECESSARILY THINKING IN TERMS OF A SECTION OF THE CITY BEING SOLELY UNDER JORDANIAN ADMINISTRATION, AND IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT THIS CLARIFICATION WHICH SYMMES HAD BEEN AUTHORISED TO GIVE WAS NOT INTENDED TO PREJUDGE ONE WAY OR THE OTHER WHAT MIGHT BE DECIDED ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY. ATHERTON SAID THAT THE WORD "SOVEREIGNTY" HAD NOT ARISEN IN SYMMES' CONVERSATIONS WITH RIFAI ABOUT JERUSALEM.

3. ATHERTON SAID THAT SYMMES HAD HAD A FURTHER TALK WITH RIFAI ON 10 FEBRUARY AFTER THE CAIRO SUMMIT MEETING. RIFAI HAD SAID HE HAD NOT GOT FAR IN SELLING THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS TO THE EGYPTIANS ON THE BASIS OF THE CLARIFICATIONS GIVEN TO HIM BY THE AMERICANS UP TILL THEN ON JERUSALEM, SYRIA AND NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES. HE CLAIMED THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL OF EAST JERUSALEM REMAINED THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION, AND THAT THE CLARIFICATION GIVEN BY SYMMES ON 4 FEBRUARY WAS INADEQUATE. WITH REGARD TO SYRIA, RIFAI SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE AMERICANS TO STATE THAT SYRIA WOULD GET THE SAME DEAL AS THE UAR AND JORDAN IF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. ATHERTON COMMENTED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD ALREADY GIVEN SUCH AN ASSURANCE INDIRECTLY IN MR ROGERS' SPEECH OF 9 DECEMBER IN WHICH HE HAD IMPLIED THAT THE SAME PRINCIPLES WOULD APPLY TO

/ALL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 483 TO F.C.O.

-3-

ALL STATES WHICH ACCEPTED THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. RIFAI HAD GRUDGINGLY ADMITTED THAT MR ROGERS' SPEECH MIGHT BE SUFFICIENT FOR JORDAN, IMPLYING THAT THE UAR WOULD TAKE A MORE DOCTRINAIRE VIEW.

4. ON NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES, RIFAI HAD GIVEN AN OBSCURE ACCOUNT OF NASSER'S THINKING. AT ONE POINT, HE HAD SAID THAT EVEN IF SATISFACTION WAS ACHIEVED ON ALL OTHER MATTERS, NASSER WOULD NOT SIT DOWN WITH THE ISRAELIS. WHEN SYMMES HAD ASKED WHETHER THIS MEANT THAT NASSER WOULD NOT DO SO AT ANY STAGE, RIFAI GAVE A RAMBLING AND CONTRADICTORY REPLY, EMPHASISING HOWEVER THAT THE WORD "RHODES" MUST BE ELIMINATED FROM ANY PROCEDURAL FORMULA. ON THE OTHER HAND KING HUSSEIN WITH WHOM SYMMES HAD DISCUSSED THESE MATTERS ON 11 FEBRUARY, SAID THAT IF JARRING GOT BACK INTO BUSINESS, IT WAS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT DEVELOP. SUBSEQUENTLY ATHERTON TELEPHONED TO MODIFY THE ACCOUNT WHICH SISCO HAD GIVEN THE MINISTER OF THE LINK MADE BY NASSER BETWEEN WITHDRAWAL AND NEGOTIATION (MY TELEGRAM NO 456). ATHERTON EXPLAINED THAT THE REPORT SISCO HAD IN MIND CAME NOT FROM THE JORDANIANS BUT FROM ANOTHER SOURCE CLOSE TO NASSER. ACCORDING TO THIS SOURCE NASSER HAD SAID AT THE TIME OF THE CAIRO SUMMIT, THAT THERE COULD BE NO NEGOTIATION WITH THE ISRAELIS WHILE THE LATTER REMAINED IN OCCUPATION OF ARAB TERRITORY SO LONG AS THEY HAD NOT ACCEPTED ANY TIME-TABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL. THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT THE DECISIVE FACTOR WOULD BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TIMETABLE NOT THE WITHDRAWAL ITSELF.

5. ATHERTON CONFIRMED THAT ACCORDING TO THE JORDANIANS IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE EGYPTIANS TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE TWO AMERICAN PAPERS OR TO ENTER INTO ANY FORM OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WHILE THE ISRAELIS CONTINUED TO BOMB DEEP INTO UAR TERRITORY AND WHILE POSSIBILITY OF THE U.S. MEETING THE ISRAELI REQUEST FOR FURTHER MILITARY AIRCRAFT REMAINED OPEN.

6. SINCE 11 FEBRUARY, ATHERTON SAID, THERE HAD BEEN NO FURTHER
/EXCHANGES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

EXCHANGES ON THE U.S. PAPERS BETWEEN SYMMES AND THE JORDANIANS. 7. MOBERLY ASKED ATHERTON WHETHER THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD YET FORMED ANY VIEW OF THE FRENCH DRAFT FOR A FOUR-POWER CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE (UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO 333 TO F C O). ATHERTON REPLIED THAT THE MATTER WAS STILL UNDER REVIEW BUT THAT THE INITIAL REACTION IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AT OFFICIAL LEVEL WAS THAT THERE WERE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE FRENCH DRAFT WHICH IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO GO ALONG WITH. MORE SPECIFICALLY, HE SAID IT OMITTED ANYTHING WHICH COULD BE REGARDED AS EVEN AN INDIRECT OBLIGATION TO CONTROL THE FEDAYEEN, WHEREAS THIS HAD BEEN A POINT OF IMPORTANCE IN THE AMERICAN DRAFT. SECONDLY, THEY WERE NOT VERY HAPPY ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH THE THRUST OF THE APPEAL HAD BEEN REVERSED IN THE FRENCH DRAFT TO GIVE PRIORITY TO THE FOUR-POWER TALKS OVER THE CEASEFIRE APPEAL. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WERE CONCERNED THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT USE THEIR LANGUAGE AS FURTHER LEVERAGE TO PULL THE FOUR-POWERS INTO A DRAFTING SESSION. ATHERTON STRESSED THAT THESE WERE INITIAL IMPRESSIONS AND THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD CERTAINLY NOT WISH TO GIVE A WHOLLY NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO THE FRENCH. THEY HOPED THAT BY SOME ADJUSTMENT ON BOTH SIDES, COMPROMISE WORDING MIGHT BE FOUND.

F C O PASS PRIORITY AMMAN TEL AVIV CAIRO PARIS MOSCOW AND SAVING BEIRUT.

MR FREEMAN.

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

/COPIES SENT TO P.S. NO. 10 DOWNING STREET AND
SIR R. HOOPER, CABINET OFFICE/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.	W.E.D.
N.A.D.	E.E.S.D.
ARABIAN DEPT.	NEWS DEPT.
AMERICAN DEPT.	RES. D. (AMERICAN SECT.)
U.N.DEPT.	RES. D. (SOVIET SECT.)
I.R.D.	RES. D. (W. & S.EUR.SECTIONS)

NNNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A


CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 383

24 FEBRUARY 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO F.C.O. TELEGRAM NO. 383 OF 24 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, AMMAN
AND SAVING TO BEIRUT, KUWAIT AND UKDEL NATO
MY TELEGRAM NO. 357: MIDDLE EAST.



AMBASSADOR EL-FARRA (JORDAN) HAS BEEN AWAY FROM NEW YORK SINCE
I CAME BACK FROM LONDON. HE CAME TO SEE ME TODAY AND I TOLD HIM OF
THE LINE I HAVE TAKEN IN THE LAST TWO MEETINGS OF THE FOUR (THAT IS
TO ADVOCATE THAT WE SHOULD DEAL WITH COMMITMENTS TO PEACE FIRST).
EL FARRA TOLD ME THAT MALIK HAD ASKED TO SEE HIM AND HE WAS TO SEE
HIM TOMORROW.

2. REFERRING TO THE LATEST AMERICAN PROPOSALS EL-FARRA SAID THAT
HIS GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IN GETTING ANY CLARIFICATION
FROM THE AMERICANS PARTICULARLY ON JERUSALEM. HE WAS DESPONDENT
ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE FOUR POWER TALKS AND ABOUT THE FUTURE,
THOUGH IT WAS IMPORTANT NEVER TO GIVE UP HOPE OF A PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT.

3. HE SAID THAT FOR SOME TIME PAST HE HAD FELT THAT IT WAS
NECESSARY TO GO BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE QUESTION OF
JERUSALEM. OTHERWISE IT MIGHT BE THOUGHT THAT THEY WERE ALLOWING
THE JERUSALEM ISSUE TO GO BY DEFAULT. BUT HE AGREED WITH ME THAT
THIS IS NOT THE BEST TIME TO GO TO THE COUNCIL ON THAT OR ANYTHING
ELSE, AND HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD HOLD
OFF ON THIS FOR ANOTHER FEW WEEKS TO SEE WHETHER THE FOUR POWER
TALKS FAILED OR NOT.

4. ON THE QUESTION OF TACTICS IN THE FOUR HIS VIEW WAS THAT WITH-
DRAWAL WAS OBVIOUSLY THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE BUT HE DID NOT DOUBT
THE MOTIVES OF THE LINE WHICH I HAD TAKEN.

F.C.O. PASS MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, AMMAN AND SAVING BEIRUT,
KUWAIT AND UKDEL NATO.

LORD CARADON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

N. AFR. D.

ARAB. D.

U.N.D.

W. EUR. D.

E.E.S.D.

AMERICAN D.

NEWS D.

RESEARCH D. (W.E. SECTION)
(AMERICAN SECTION)
(SOVIET SECTION)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
FOUR POWER TALKS ON MIDDLE EAST.

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4.3.70

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

PRIORITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 121

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE


10 MARCH 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

9

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 121 DATED 10/3 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK ROUTINE BEIRUT TEL AVIV WASHINGTON
PARIS AND MOSCOW.



MIPT (NOT TO ALL): MIDDLE EAST.

I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO TELL KING HUSSEIN ABOUT THE VIEWS
ON WITHDRAWAL AND BOUNDARIES EXPRESSED BY LORD CARADON AT THE
5 MARCH MEETING AS AUTHORISED IN YOUR TEL NO 266 TO CAIRO. I
ADDED THAT LORD CARADON HAD MADE THESE POINTS BEFORE, THAT HE
HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE BUSINESS-LIKE ATMOSPHERE AT THE LATEST
MEETING AND THAT H.M.G. WOULD WORK HARD TO KEEP UP THE NEW
MOMENTUM.

NEM 2/11

2. THE KING SEEMED GLAD TO HEAR THIS. HE SAID HE HAD JUST
HAD A RATHER ENCOURAGING ACCOUNT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS FROM
MY SOVIET COLLEAGUE (WHO HAD HAD AN UNUSUALLY LONG AUDIENCE
ATTENDED, IN PART, BY THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER).

FCO PASS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON PARIS AND MOSCOW.

per UK 19/3

SIR P ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

N.EASTERN D.
N.AFR.D.
ARAB.D.
U.N.D.
AMERICAN D.
E.EUR.& SOV.D.
RES.D.(W.EUR.SEC.)
RES.D.(SOVIET SEC.)
RES.D.(AMERICAN SEC.)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION:

4 POWER TALKS ON MIDDLE EAST

DDDDD

CONFIDENTIAL

(10)

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY AMMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 123

12 MARCH 1970

TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 123 OF 12 MARCH REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION PRIORITY TO UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE TO BEIRUT,
CAIRO, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, PARIS AND MOSCOW.

MY TEL NO 121: MIDDLE EAST.

(9)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 12 MAR 1970 NEM 2/14

JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER THIS MORNING CONFIRMED TO ME
THAT HE HAD BEEN PRESENT AT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S AUDIENCE
ON 10 MARCH AND SAID THAT MY COLLEAGUE HAD ASKED ON INSTRUCTIONS
FOR A CLEAR STATEMENT OF THE JORDANIAN POSITION ON QUOTE
WITHDRAWAL UNQUOTE. RIFAI SAID HE HAD HEARD FROM CAIRO THAT
VINOGRADOV HAD DISCUSSED THE SAME SUBJECT DURING HIS RECENT
VISIT TO THE UAR.

2. THE MINISTER SAID THAT HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT, IN THE
JORDANIAN VIEW, WITHDRAWAL MEANT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ISRAELI
TROOPS TO BEHIND THE LINES WHICH HAD EXISTED ON 4 JUNE 1967.
IF THAT PRINCIPLE WAS ACCEPTED, JORDAN WOULD AGREE THAT THE
SECURE AND RECOGNISED BOUDARIES WOULD BE THE 1949 LINES, WHICH
COULD BE SUBJECT TO MINOR RECTIFICATIONS (PROVIDED THAT THESE
WERE NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF ONE PARTY ONLY). THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR
HAD SAID THAT THIS WAS THE POSITION OF HIS GOVERNMENT ALSO.

plk 143

/ 3. I THEN TOLD

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

3. I THEN TOLD THE MINISTER OF THE STATEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL MADE BY LORD CARADON ON 5 MARCH AND HE COMMENTED THAT OUR POSITION SEEMED TO BE VERY CLOSE TO THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION. IT WAS A PITY THAT THE AMERICANS WERE STILL REFUSING TO MAKE A POSITIVE STATEMENT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL TO JERUSALEM. I URGED HIM NOT TO MAKE TOO MUCH OF THAT, AFTER ALL, JARRING WOULD NOT BE OPERATING ON AN AMERICAN BUT ON A FOUR - POWER BRIEF, AND IT LOOKED AT THE MOMENT AS THOUGH SOMETHING ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS ON WITHDRAWAL MIGHT WELL EMERGE FROM THE FOUR. RIFAI SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS.

4. PLEASE REPEAT MY TEL UNDER REFERENCE TO CAIRO.

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO UKMIS NEW YORK ROUTINE TO WASHINGTON, PARIS AND MOSCOW.

SIR P ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

[ACTION TAKEN BY COMMS DEPT QUERY SECTION
RE PARAGRAPH 4 REQUEST].

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

N.E.D.

N.A.D.

ARABIAN DEPT

U.N.D.

AMERICAN DEPT

E.E.S.D.

RESEARCH DEPT (W.E.SEC.)

" " (SOVIET SEC.)

" " (AMERICAN SEC.)

&&&&&

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION:

FOUR POWER TALKS ON MIDDLE EAST

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICES

TELEGRAM NO 124

12 MARCH 1970

RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY No. 10

13 MAR 1970

NEM 2/14

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 124 OF 12 MARCH REPEATED FOR INFO
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE CAIRO, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON,
PARIS, MOSCOW AND BEIRUT.

UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO 539:

MIDDLE EAST - FOUR POWER TALKS.

IN REVIEWING FORMULATIONS ABOUT PEACE AND WITHDRAWAL I
HOPE THAT THE POINT ABOUT CONTROL OF THE FEDAYEEN MADE IN MY
TELEGRAM NO 59 CAN BE KEPT IN MIND.

2. JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY MADE TO ME WITH EMPHASIS
THE POINT THAT SPELLING OUT ARAB GOVERNMENTS' OBLIGATIONS AT THIS
STAGE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO THE EXTENT
THAT IT WOULD ENCOURAGE FEDAYEEN RESISTANCE. RIFAI SAID THAT
ARAB GOVERNMENTS RECOGNISED THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT
OBLIGATIONS IN THIS SENSE IN THE CONTEXT OF A SETTLEMENT BUT
THAT EXPERIENCE SHOWED THAT THE FEDAYEEN WERE EASIER TO CONTAIN
IF HANDLED GENTLY (C.F. PARA 5 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 178 TO UKMIS
NEW YORK).

CONFIDENTIAL

/ FCO PASS

72 US
18/3

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE TO WASHINGTON.
PARIS AND MOSCOW.

SIR P ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

N.E.D.
N.AFRI DEPT
ARABIAN DEPT

U.N.D.
W. EUR. DEPT

E.E.S.D.
AMERICAN DEPT

RESEARCH DEPT (W.E.SEC.)
" " (AMERICAN SEC.)
" " (SOVIET SEC.)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION:

FOUR POWER TALKS ON MIDDLE EAST.

&&&&

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

(12)



2/4

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 27 APR 1970 NEM 2/14

LAST PAPER

BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO.

22 April 1970.

Dear Father,

Arab-Israel.

Mr. Fopp
24.4
M. Evans
M. Jones
E. J. R. E.
24/4

Thank you for your letter of 13 April about our talking with the Egyptians here on the progress of the New York Four-Power talks. I have not, in fact, felt free hitherto to pass on detailed accounts of the Four-Power talks to the Egyptians, though we have all had fairly frequent general discussions at various levels in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this subject in the past. I therefore took advantage of the encouragement in your letter under reference to arm myself with the factual reports from the U.K. Mission, New York, of the Four-Power meetings (but not of course U.K. Mission's comments) and went to see yesterday Mr. Mohammed Riad, Chef de Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I approached the subject rather on the same lines as I had approached the Minister on the question of Chieftains for Libya (my telegrams nos. 472 and 473, especially paragraph 4 of 472), saying that I hoped to enlarge and deepen the scope of my personal contacts with him and the Minister on various subjects of mutual interest, including the Four-Power talks.

2. Mr. Mohammed Riad said that as both he and his Minister had been away in Dar es Salaam for a week, they had neither of them read themselves back into the Four-Power talks and therefore he had not really very much to discuss. This being so, I decided not to pass on to him any of the accounts given in U.K. Mission's telegrams of the meetings of the deputies but merely to let him see the interim report of the deputies to the Four (U.K. Mission telegram no. 854). He expressed gratification for this and at the prospect of further conversations and said he would let me

/know

G. G. Arthur Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London, S.W.1.

px 164/5

LAST PAPER

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL



BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO.

know when he had re-briefed himself so that we
could discuss the matter again.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Fred
Warner in New York.

Yours ever

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'R. A. Beaumont', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

(R. A. Beaumont)